



# THE KEYNOTER



## SPECIAL ISSUE

CLARK CLIFFORD: IF I SHOULD WRITE A BOOK

TREASURES FROM  
THE MUSEUM OF AMERICAN POLITICAL LIFE

## Managing Editor's Message

We are very pleased to publish this two-part special issue of the Keynoter. Both of these projects have been many months in the making, and their presentation is another affirmation of the role of the Keynoter as a recognized journal of campaign and political history.

We are particularly proud that Clark Clifford has authorized the Keynoter to offer the first publication of his John McGovern Award presentation. Mr. Clifford has been an almost unique figure on the Washington scene for 44 years—one of the very few persons in modern American history of whom it can legitimately be said that he is a legend in his own lifetime. As Republicans and Democrats have affirmed for years, he is a man of uncommon perception and unimpeachable integrity. He has been an advisor to many of the major Democratic figures of the postwar period, while maintaining an aversion to personal publicity and a gift for pragmatism in the political arena.

Patrick Anderson, in his book about White House assistants and advisors during the period 1933-1968, *The President's Men*, said of Clark Clifford, "[his] appointment (as Secretary of Defense in 1968) capped a remarkable career; Clifford must rank as one of the most successful—perhaps the most successful—of all the talented and ambitious men who have struggled in the shadows of presidential power." In speaking of his role in the internal debates over Viet Nam policy, Anderson went on, "Clark Clifford has surely earned a place as not only one of the most spectacular but one of the most significant political figures in Washington history."

When John Kennedy entered the White House, he appointed Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the well-known Harvard historian and author of the 3 volume "Age of Roosevelt 1928-36" as White House Historian. After spending more than a year observing the presidential decision-making process from the inside, Schlesinger spoke out about the differences between writing history through scholarship and the reality of history as current events. He noted the approach of historians in describing decisions made in the past, with the knowledge of how the decisions turned out, as contrasted with the real world in which important decisions are made using the facts available in what are frequently turbulent situations for which some form of action is necessitated. He concluded that most historians can only peripherally discern the actual evaluation process leading to crucial decisions. The only people who truly know how decisions were reached are the people involved in that process.

Clark Clifford's very candid comments on the people and the controversies behind many of the major decisions of our time give us a clearer understanding of our recent history.



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APIC seeks to encourage and support the study and preservation of original materials issuing from and relating to political campaigns of the United States of America and to bring its members fuller appreciation and deeper understanding of the candidates and issues that form our political heritage.

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## SPECIAL ISSUE

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**Illustrations:** The Editors wish to thank the University of Hartford, The Museum of American Political Life, Dr. Edmund Sullivan, Clark M. Clifford and Brian VanDerMark for providing the illustrations for this issue.

**Covers:** *Front:* Silk and satin r w/b blk shield which hung in the Illinois state legislature during the mourning period following Lincoln's assassination;  
*Back:* Inscribed to Clark Clifford, Key West, Florida, November 1949.

## IN THE NEXT ISSUE

The Winter Keynoter will feature interviews with Eugene McCarthy and Shirley Chisom, several articles, including one about Winston Churchill and the Iron Curtain speech, a previously unpublished letter, projects, and more.

# The Cosmos Club Foundation and The John P. McGovern Award

The Cosmos Club, founded in 1878, was created for the advancement of its members in science, literature, and art, and "their mutual improvement by social intercourse."

The Cosmos Club Foundation, created by Cosmos Club members in 1967, is a tax exempt organization intrusted specifically with the task of advancing science, literature, the arts and humanities through awards and grants for charitable and educational purposes.

In furtherance of these activities, John P. McGovern, M.D., endowed the foundation with a special fund for an annual series of three awards and lectures respectively in science, literature, and the arts and humanities. An advisory committee of Cosmos Club members recom-

mends to the Foundation Trustees awardees whose endeavors have clearly distinguished them as leaders in their spheres of activity. The awardees are presented with medals commemorating their selection and present lectures at the Cosmos Club in their respective categories. The Honorable Clark Clifford was the first lecturer and award recipient for the McGovern Lecture Series.

John P. McGovern has been a member of the Cosmos Club since 1953. He is a noted physician, educator, author and medical historian. He is director of the McGovern Allergy Clinic, the nation's largest private allergy clinic, and is chairman of the board of the Texas Allergy Research Foundation and the John P. McGovern Foundation.

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## CLARK M. CLIFFORD

Clark M. Clifford has served in government and worked in a variety of posts in the private sector for more than fifty years. In 1969 he was awarded the Medal of Freedom with Distinction by President Lyndon B. Johnson, the highest award given to U.S. civilians. He is also a recipient of the Harry S. Truman Public Service Award.

A native of Fort Scott, Kansas, Mr. Clifford attended public schools and then went to college and law school at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. He graduated in 1928, and practiced law in St. Louis.

A volunteer for service in the United States Naval Reserve in 1943, Mr. Clifford received the commission of Lieutenant (j.g.) He was separated from the service in 1946 with the permanent rank of Captain.

He was appointed Special Counsel to the President of the United States in June, 1946 by President Harry S. Truman and served in that capacity until February 1, 1950.

He resigned as Counsel to the President on February 1, 1950, and established a law firm in Washington, D.C.

In 1960, Mr. Clifford served as a member of the Committee on the Defense Establishment, appointed by Senator John F. Kennedy to survey the organization, management and administration of the Defense Department. He was appointed by President-Elect Kennedy to be his representative, during the transition period, with the Eisenhower Administration.

President Kennedy appointed Mr. Clifford a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1961, and Chairman of the Board in 1962.

In 1966, Mr. Clifford served as an advisor to President Johnson at the Manila Conference.

President Johnson nominated Mr. Clifford to be Secretary of Defense in January, 1968, and he was unani-

mously confirmed by the United States Senate. He served as Secretary of Defense until January, 1969 after which he returned to the practice of law in Washington, D.C. as a senior partner in the firm of Clifford & Warnke.

He was appointed by President Carter in 1977 to be Special Emissary to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and as Special Emissary to India in 1980.





# If I Should Write A Book

By Clark M. Clifford

I wish to thank Mr. Meyers for his generous, gracious and most felicitous introduction.

I appreciate being selected as the recipient of this honor.

I might say parenthetically that I felt a sense of considerable relief when I learned that Mr. McGovern's first name is John.

When Dr. Samuel Johnson, the great English lexicologist, was at the height of his power and influence, a writer of that day who had a vastly inflated opinion of his own ability and importance sent a manuscript to Dr. Johnson to read. Dr. Johnson did, and wrote him the following letter:

"Dear Sir:

I have read your manuscript. It is both good and original. The trouble with it, however, is the part that's good is not original. And the part that's original is not good."

So I take very much to heart Dr. Johnson's comment about a manuscript, and I shall not have one.

I am a great buyer of books. Each Sunday, I read the New York Times book review section and then I hasten out to

buy some more books. And the books accumulate. Mr. Meyers referred to the Labyrinth and Theseus. I sometimes feel like he did on his way in and the way out of slaying the Minotaur. I've almost gotten to the point where I borrow Marny's thread to find my way out. The reason for this is that I buy books and I read 30 to 40 pages and then my interest wanes.

Now I'm thinking about writing a book and I thought that I would utilize this opportunity to tell you what I had in mind and then see if I could sense a reaction from you people here tonight that might help me make that ultimate decision. I think — the trouble I find with so many books today is that I am unable to relate with the author. I'm not particularly interested in him. I haven't known very much about him and, often times, the book tells me more about a subject than I want to know; or it isn't the subject that I thought it was going to be.

So what I intend to do in my allotted time tonight is trace the kind of book that I would write and then I will learn from some of you later whether or not you think it has merit.

My story begins with a young lawyer in St. Louis. I went there to Washington University, to college, and then to law school. And I came to the bar on June 1, 1928. My ambition was to be the best trial lawyer in the area. I had already made up my mind that that was the phase of the law I wished to get into.

Not only did I ultimately picture myself as the best trial lawyer in St. Louis, but I wanted to be the best in the whole Middle West, so that when an important case came I would likely be in it.

So in my first week there in the law firm, I went to the judges of the various criminal courts and asked that my name be entered there so that if they had a defendant who could not afford a lawyer, I would be willing to represent him. This was long before the days of the concept of Public Defender.

And within two or three days a call came and I was assigned a case. His name was John Piper. He was charged with stealing an automobile. And I went and saw him in the City Jail. I saw all the witnesses. And I prepared a detailed brief of the law in Missouri. I read the lives of famous criminal lawyers. I read the finest books on evidence and cross-examination. And finally the day came and our trial started. It went really very well for three days. And then my summation time came. And, oh, I had worked on it so hard. And I felt when I finished it that its equal had not probably been heard there for many years. And the jury went out and in 15 minutes they came back. And I sat up straighter and smiled. And they found him guilty and gave him 20 years.



"Clark M. Clifford, the new naval aide to President Truman" 1946

And the judge called me up and he said, "This didn't turn out very well." I felt like the roof had fallen in. I said that is probably, in my life, the greatest understatement I'd encountered. "Well," he said, "I'm going to assign you another case right away." "No," I said, "Judge, I think maybe I'm more cut out to be an appellate lawyer than a trial lawyer." "No," he said, "this is like getting thrown from a horse. The thing to do is get right up again, climb back on the horse or you'll be horse-shy." And I said, "Well, why don't you let me think about it." "No," he said. "You're an officer of this Court and the Court will direct you as it sees fit." And in two days I was assigned another case.

That one went a little better. I emphasize "little", because my client got only 15 years. And then calls began to come in from the other judges. So I went back again and again. Three, four, five. For four months I kept a steady stream of clients going up to the State Penitentiary. And I thought I was never going to win one. I began to get a little stubborn about it. But I was learning every time. The cases were hard, mean cases. And yet you learn, and you learn it only by doing it.

Finally, the day came. It must have been the fourteenth case. The jury came in and said, "Not guilty."

And it was a great day for me because I thought I was doomed never to win a case in my life.

Later that same week, Mr. Holland, the senior member of our firm was arguing a civil motion before the same judge who had presided in my criminal case, Judge Hartman. And when Mr. Holland — a very dignified, older man who wore big high Herbert Hoover collars —

was finished, the judge called Mr. Holland to the bench and said, "Mr. Holland, a young lawyer in your firm won a fine verdict in my criminal court earlier this week." Well, Mr. Holland beamed and said, "Isn't that splendid." "Yes," Judge Hartman said, "it was substantially against the weight of the evidence." "Oh," Mr. Holland said, "that's just fine." And Judge Hartman said, "His name is Clifford." And the judge reported to me later Mr. Holland says, "Clifford? Clifford?" "No," he says, "we don't have anybody by that name."

So my week of success had something of the bright shine taken off of it.

But this got me launched. Now what I'm attempting to do is see whether you can begin to identify with this young lawyer who had this consuming ambition. Trying these cases, the judges reporting that he had been learning and all, led the partners in the firm to say, "Well, let's us start using this young man." So they began to give him cases. No criminal cases because we didn't do that kind of work, but civil cases.

So this became my life for 15 years, trying lawsuits. Week in and week out. Ninety per cent of my time, I spent in court. Progressing, learning, becoming more skillful in the presentation of the cases. And this was to be my life. And I could picture myself proceeding on this course. It seemed clear to me. It seemed to be appropriate. It seemed to be a profound quest for excellence.

And then everything changed.

My whole life changed. Our country went to war. And Mary, my wife, and I looked at it carefully during 1942 after December 7 of '41, and I became more uncomfortable



Fulton, MO: Winston Churchill; William Leahy, Military Advisor to the President (behind Churchill); Clark Clifford; Harry Vaughn, Military Aide; President Truman 1946

as time went on. For a while I thought, "Well, it won't take long. The Japanese. Gracious, here we are this enormous, tremendously powerful United States." But as we got from '42 into '43 it looked like it was going to last forever. So I went down and volunteered for the Navy, after talking it over in detail with Marny. She took our children and went back with her people in Boston where she had lived, and I went into the service.

A very interesting and fortunate career in a number of different posts and then I ended up on the staff of a four-star Admiral. But I was looking all the time to the conclusion of my Navy career, so I could get back to my chosen goal.

Then came word from the White House. I'd seen the White House as a visitor in Washington when I had been here on business, but I had never been in the White House. And the word came that I was to report to the White House. This was an exciting event. I did not know President Truman who had just taken office. But his Naval Aide had been a client of mine in St. Louis. And he was going to go to Potsdam with the President and he wanted a friend and confidant to come in and take over his office while he was gone.

This proved to be a very interesting experience. Now, the opportunity that existed within the White House then was wholly unique. Keep in mind that when a man runs for the office of President, he starts very early. He surrounds himself with a small group of about ten intimate advisors. Then a larger group around them of about 20 whom he calls on from time to time, and who serve him in various capacities. And then a larger group

around of 40 or 50 to help him with the contributions and raise the money. This is the team that he gets together. He finally makes it through the primaries, he is nominated, he goes through the campaign, he is elected. And his team comes from this group. His staff usually comes from the small group around him, and then Cabinet members perhaps will come from the larger group. But that isn't what happened to Harry Truman at all.

On the 12th of April 1945, at the end of the day, Harry Truman went over to have a drink with Sam Rayburn. Sam Rayburn had a room off of his office which was called the Board of Education. It consisted mainly of a large bar. A man could go over and visit Sam Rayburn and when he was called his girl would say, "Oh, he is over at the Board of Education." Which, to the knowledgeable meant he's over having a drink with Sam. And Vice President Truman was having a drink with Sam on that late afternoon of April 12th. The phone rang, the operator said, "Mr. Vice President?" He said, "Yes." She said, "Mrs. Roosevelt wishes to speak to you." Mrs. Roosevelt came on and said, "Mr. Vice President?" (They hardly knew each other.) He said, "Yes." She said, "This is Eleanor Roosevelt. I'm sorry to have to tell you that Franklin has died. You will wish to come to the White House immediately. Come to the Cabinet Room."

He did. Within an hour, he was President of the United States. He had no team at all. He had four people who worked for him in his office as Vice President. And the team of Mr. Roosevelt chose not to stay.

Mr. Roosevelt had this tremendous reputation, and properly so. He'd brought the country through the worst



Oval Office: President Truman; Clark Clifford; William Hassett, Correspondence Secretary; Matt Connelly, Appointments Secretary; Charles Ross, Press Secretary. 1947



depression of its history and was successfully bringing the country through the worst war in the country's history and then he suddenly died.

President Truman was not known. He was a rather obscure Senator from the State of Missouri. He had been in some business ventures. He'd been selected for the post by a man named Pendergast who was a political leader in Missouri with a questionable reputation. So those who had been so close to the great Roosevelt said, "This is our time to go."

So when I came in just a month or so after Mr. Truman became President, the most incredible vacuum existed within the White House. The old staff was leaving. Cabinet members were leaving. If you could do anything, you were put to work doing it. So that, under ordinary circumstances, a young fellow in my position would probably have to stay three or four years before he began to do anything very important. I think within a week or two after getting there I was getting assignments of one kind and another which were growing in importance. The President and his staff were away at Potsdam over this period of time. By the time they came back, I — by comparison with others — was practically an old hand at the White House. So the assignments increased in importance and it became an enormously exciting and fulfilling and rewarding life.

A little about Harry Truman.

This is a triumph of the American system. Here's a boy who was raised on one of those hardscrabble farms in

northern Missouri, near Independence. He was apparently a good farm boy. His mother one time said very proudly, "Harry can plow the straightest furrow in Jackson County." That's the ultimate accolade, apparently. And he came from fine old Scotch and English stock. But they had nothing. They eked out a living on the farm, God-fearing Baptist people, strong and sturdy. He grew up with the land. An undistinguished life. The highlight of his life was getting in the Army and going to France in the closing days of World War I where he served in the artillery.

He came back and became what was known as the County Judge. That's not a judge. He's Commissioner of Roads. But it was given that dignified title. And they needed a candidate for United States Senate, and Pendergast called him in and he said, "I've watched your career, Truman, and," he said, "I want a man who is decisive and I want a man who is effective, and I want a man who is thorough, but most of all I want a man who is honest, and you fulfill that bill." And so Harry Truman came up here to Washington.

The qualities that Harry Truman had proved to be highly desirable in a President. In the first place, he was a very modest man. And when he came in, he was conscious of the fact that he knew very little about the institution of the Presidency. But he was a good, quick learner. He was willing to sit and listen. He was a humble man who respected above everything the institution of the Presidency and what he might be able to do for the country. So



Train Platform, Washington, D.C.: Harry Vaughn; Clark Clifford; President Truman; Wallace Graham, Personal Physician to the President; Secret Service Agent. 1946



he learned, and he learned steadily. He made mistakes, as all the rest of them around him did. But we were all getting through it and learning and improving.

As time went on, he became more confident in the position. And then when the War was over, he entered what could in some respects be the most critical time that our country had faced, possibly since the Civil War.

In Potsdam, he'd gotten to know Stalin. And they had formed a relationship. They had both been farmers originally. President Truman invited him over to a private luncheon. He said they talked for over three hours together and exchanged ideas — through interpreters, of course. But they began to develop some sense of understanding. So when the President came back from Potsdam, he had a sense of confidence that he would be able to work with Stalin. And it was the President's deepest hope that we could effect a permanent concord with the Soviet Union that could lead ultimately to a lasting peace in the world.

We had gotten along so well as allies. We had sent mountains of material to the Soviets. They had the greatest respect for our industrial capacity, and we for their courage in fighting for their homeland. The battle of the defense of Stalingrad is one of the great human epics of all time. The Soviets lost 20 million men in the Second World War.

And yet, despite this background of splendid cooperation during the War, Stalin's idea of the future was very different from that of President Truman. In that period, in rapid succession, the Soviets took charge of all of the nations on their western periphery — Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, later Hungary — in direct contravention of the Acts and contracts of Yalta, Teheran and Potsdam. They then started on a period of the most aggressive kind of expansionism. They began to press against Eastern Europe. And press and spread out. They developed the COMINTERN, which was the establishment of a Communist cell in every country of significance, from which it would spread out and spread the Communist philosophy in that country.

The showdown came in December of 1946, a whole year after the War had ended — a year of increasing pessimism on President Truman's part with reference to his hopes of working with the Soviets. We had a note from the British. The British said, "We are sending you a formal note shortly telling you we must terminate our aid to Greece and Turkey." They had been supporting Greece and Turkey for many years, both militarily and economically. The British were bled dry. "We can no longer do it," they said. When the final note came, it ended with the expression that they hoped that the United States could pick up this burden. They commented on the fact that Greece and Turkey were exceedingly important to the Eastern Mediterranean. They said also that ultimately they might become the southern anchor of an Eastern Europe defense line.

This was an extraordinarily difficult problem for President Truman. From time immemorial, we had followed the parting admonition of our first President, George Washington, when he said in his Farewell

Address, "Do not become involved in entangling European alliances." For centuries, wars had gone on in Europe. Washington said, "Stay out of those." Now here was almost a demand — certainly the request — "Come in and support this crisis situation that exists."

It was contrary to our policy of 175 years. But, if the United States did not do it, then no one would do it. There was a feeling of hopelessness in the world. Europe was prostrate. Here these countries were facing this direct challenge. I think it is everlastingly to President Truman's credit, and probably may be the brightest star in his crown from the standpoint of future historians. He accepted that responsibility and undertook the task of convincing the Congress that this was our burden. This area had always been under the aegis of the British and the great British fleet. We had no connections in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was a new experience for us. He faced up to it. He took it on. And he went up to the Congress in March 1947 and delivered a speech to the Joint Session, and enunciated what became known as the Truman Doctrine. And it sent a thrill all over the world because, prior to that, there was a feeling of great pessimism at that time. He said, "It must be the responsibility of the United States to come to the aid of those countries that are being beset by the forces of Communism either from without or within." He didn't mention Communism by name. Everybody knew exactly what he meant, and the world stood up a little straighter. And the President and the Congress said they were going to do it. It was the United States facing up to its responsibilities as a world power in the Twentieth Century.

The Soviets took note. The Soviets had to take note. One fundamental factor existed at the time that the countries' leaders never forgot for a moment. The United States had The Bomb and the Soviets didn't. That was an enormous advantage. They could not risk going on with what they were originally planning to do. They wanted Greece and Turkey. It suited them. It was the key to control of the whole Mediterranean.

Not content with that, the President was really learning what was needed. The next great step came — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — when we entered into an agreement with our allies in Europe which said to the Soviet Union, "If you attack any one of our allies in Europe, you are attacking the United States and you are at war." NATO has kept the peace for 38 years. The Soviets have not dared. They wanted Europe. They could have taken Europe right after the War, had it not been for the United States. They could have moved through Europe like a warm knife through a cake of butter. There was no fight left in Europe. But they could not take on the possibility of war with the United States. Again, the United States came and met a responsibility that our country chose to confront.

Then, finally, the third leg in this remarkable stool, came the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was born in the fertile brain of Dean Acheson — one of the really fine minds in our country's history. He said, "Here's an opportunity for us to resuscitate Europe. It's not going to make it by itself. And the attitudes of its people are

important. A man leaves home in the morning searching for work and his wife and family don't have food and they don't have clothing and they don't have housing. That's the kind of people who ultimately fall prey to Communism." He went down to a small town in Alabama and launched as a trial balloon a speech suggesting the possibility of a great plan of rehabilitation for Western Europe. We watched the reaction with great interest and care because we had just been through this great war. We had lost tens of thousands of our best men. We had spent hundreds of billions of our country's treasure. We didn't know what the attitude of the people would be. It was surprisingly favorable. And Acheson came back and reported at the White House. The President began to get interested in it. And we then went to work on planning it and working together.

I remember going into the President's office one time after some weeks of planning, and one could sense within himself that this was one of the signal events of our time. And I remember saying to President Truman, "I would hope, Mr. President, that in some way your name might be associated with this great event." Which I might say I now see was but an evidence of my inexperience. Because he said, "No, we have a Republican Senate and a Republican House and we have an election coming in 1948 and anything that goes up there with the name Truman on it is going to lie and quiver a little and die." And he said, "We're going to have to find another way to do this." So he gave it a great deal of thought and it later came to his attention that General Marshall was going to make the commencement address at Harvard that spring. The speech was prepared, written and rewritten and polished, and he made the decision that it should be given to General Marshall. It was an extraordinarily astute decision.

General Marshall made the speech. The world responded magnificently and in three days it was known as the Marshall Plan. And the Congress could take it. The Republicans could get out on the floor and speak in favor of the Marshall Plan. We put billions of dollars into the rehabilitation of Europe.

Arnold Toynbee is regarded by many thoughtful people and by many historians as one of the world's greatest historians. Certainly the British regard him so. Here's what he had to say at the end of President Truman's term. And I think you may remember it, as I have:

"It was not the discovery of atomic energy but the solicitude of the world's most privileged people for its less privileged as vested in Truman's Point Four and the Marshall Plan. This will be remembered as the signal achievement of our age."

What a tremendous thing to be able to say. So I think that history will look back on President Truman and that five-year period as one of the most memorable and one of the most productive in our country's history. It can fairly be said that the United States saved the Free World during that period.

Now all was not work and worry and stress. Occa-

sionally something would happen that lent a little lighter note to it. We met every morning at eight o'clock, President Truman and his six staff members. The White House was very small in those days.

The mail clerk came in one morning with an envelope. It was a lavender envelope, large size and down in the right-hand, lower corner was a very formal regal wax seal and there were ribbons flowing from it. The President said, "Bill, what is this." Bill said, "It is a letter to you, Mr. President, from Ibn Saud, the King of Saudi Arabia." So the President opened it and his eyes widened. He said, "Listen to this." The salutation was, "Your Magnificence." The President said, "Let me read that again, 'Your Magnificence.'" "Well," he said, "Now wait a minute. This is sounding better, 'Your Magnificence'." He said, "It's got kind of a little ring to it, 'Your Magnificence'." "Well," he says, "I don't know. Maybe I could learn to like this."

Then he said, "I don't know what you fellows call me when I'm not with you. But it's alright from now on for you to refer to me as 'His Magnificence'."

About ten days later, President Truman sent a message to the United Nations urging the admission of a hundred thousand Jews to Palestine — a thoroughly noble act on his part. In three days, he had another letter from Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia. This one started, "Dear Sir".

Let me digress — I can do it in three or four minutes — to a memorable week. In the spring of 1946, the obscure President of an obscure college in Missouri wrote a letter to President Truman. His name was McClure and he was president of Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. I had lived in Missouri all my life and I don't believe I had ever heard of Fulton, Missouri. And McClure said to Mr. Truman, "Dear Mr. President, you don't know me." "But," he said, "I'm president of the Westminster College and I was thinking about the selection of a speaker for our commencement exercises this spring and it occurred to me that it would be a splendid choice if Winston Churchill would come and make our commencement address." This was a real long shot. But the President said, "Now wait a minute." He said, "You know, I've never gotten to know Mr. Churchill. I went to meet with him and Stalin at Potsdam but on the second day of that Potsdam Conference they had an election back in Great Britain and, to everybody's complete astonishment the British people went to the polls and voted Winston Churchill out of office and put in his bitter political enemy named Clement Attlee. And under their system you're elected one day and you take office the next.

So Attlee could hardly wait to get to Potsdam, which forced Churchill, under the most humiliating circumstances to pack his bag and leave Potsdam, and Clement Attlee took his place." So the President said, "I haven't gotten to know Churchill and I'd like to get to know him and I'm going to write him and send him a copy of this letter."

He did. Practically by return mail, "Dear Mr. President, I have your interesting letter and the splendid letter from President McClure and I accept with pleasure."

Mr. Churchill came a couple of days early so they could

get acquainted. And we boarded the President's car at noontime — they had the private car called the Magellan, a long, specially built car; the last third of it was furnished as a very attractive men's club room. So we sat there, the President and Mr. Churchill and the six staff members. And Mr. Churchill, as the train pulled away, said, "Now, Mr. President, we're going to be together for practically a week." And he said, "I would like to have the privilege of calling you 'Harry'." And the President said "Oh, Mr. Churchill, I honor you greatly and I would be delighted and pleased if you called me 'Harry'." Mr. Churchill said, "And you must call me 'Winston'." "No," the President said, "I don't believe I can do that. I consider you the First Citizen in the World and my regard for you is so deep-seated I ..." "Well," Mr. Churchill said, "then I can't call you 'Harry'." "Well," the President said, "if that's the way you feel about it, Winston, we'll do it."

The President wanted to make a little conversation, so he said, after a little lull, "About a month ago, Clement Attlee came to visit me." You could feel the atmosphere chill. There was a moment's silence. Churchill said, "There is less there than meets the eye." The President felt he may have stumbled into it, but he felt he had to go on. He said, "Well, he's a very modest sort of man." And then everybody, I think, has heard Mr. Churchill's reply. He said, "Yes, he has a great deal to be modest about."

But then, after a little while, it picked up a bit and then Mr. Churchill said, "Harry, I see by the press that you play poker." "Yes," he said, "I've played a good deal of poker." "Well," Churchill said, "I started playing poker in the Boer War. Now do you think that on this trip we can play a little poker?" "Oh," the President said, "I'll guarantee that we can." "Oh," he said, "that's fine, because I want to try it."

That afternoon, when Mr. Churchill was taking a siesta, the President called us all in together. We had all played a lot of poker together. And he said, "Men." And we stood there. He said, "The reputation of American poker is at stake. This man's very smart and he's probably a very highly skilled poker player." So he said, "I expect every man to do his duty." I felt a little like I had been a midshipman and Lord Nelson was about to meet the French at Trafalgar. Do you see? This was it, "Do your duty."

Well, soon as dinner was over that evening, on the dining room table the mess boys spread a green cover and we went at it. In about an hour and a half, Mr. Churchill excused himself to go to the men's room and the President leaned over and counted his stack and said, "Now look here, men. We've only played an hour and a half and Mr. Churchill has lost \$350. Now that's not being very friendly." Vaughn, the Military Aide, spoke up and said, "Boss, you can't have this both ways." He said, "This guy's a pigeon."

So it was discussed at some length and we played every night, going three nights to get to Independence. We played three nights coming back. And it was arranged so that he won wonderful pots. I saw a fellow next to me one time lay down three queens and Churchill won with a pair

of jacks. It worked out though. At the very end, it was carefully nurtured and counted and controlled and Churchill lost about \$150. And that made it just right.

I have taken more time on Mr. Truman than I intended. I want to quickly touch on President Kennedy.

What I am doing is to pick out interesting items to give you the flavor and see if I find that your interest remains at a sufficient level.

I had known Congressman and Senator Kennedy for four or five years before he became President. During that period, I became his lawyer. We had one instance that was memorable. It must have been in about early 1959. The phone rang and it was Senator Kennedy and he said, "I want to come see you right away." I said, "Well, I will come to your office." "No," he said, "I would rather you didn't come here." He came and he was quite agitated. It was a Tuesday. He said, "Last night on the ABC television program Drew Pearson appeared as a guest and stated on a nationwide hookup that it was a national scandal that John F. Kennedy had received the Pulitzer Prize for writing the book *Profiles in Courage* because, as a matter of fact, according to Pearson, John F. Kennedy did not write the book. That it had been ghostwritten." Senator Kennedy said, "It's very upsetting to me and very upsetting to my family." About that time the phone rang and it was Senator Kennedy's father, Ambassador Kennedy. And he said, "Clark?" And I said, "Yes, Mr. Ambassador." He said, "I want you to sue the \*\*\*\*\* for \$50 million." He said, "They can't do this to my boy." And he said, "Get that suit in. I want you to file it today." I said, "Well, we'll certainly think about it. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador." And then we talked about it some more and I said, "We can't do that, that's the worst thing in the world to do because it publicizes it over and over again and keeps the matter alive for the next two years while the suit is pending. Now let's get at it." I said, "Now, tell me. Is it true?" He said, "It is not true. I did write the book. I had some help on researching it." I said, "How can you prove it? Prove to me that you wrote the book." He said, "When I was ill from a back operation in Florida, I sat in my bed day after day and wrote in longhand notebooks." I said, "Can you find those?" He said, "Sure, we can find them."

We spent two days getting ready and then went to New York. I had called the President of ABC and said, "I want you and your counsel and all your lawyers to get together. You have libeled my client and you're in terrible trouble."

We met for two days. The late afternoon of the second day, they said, "You have proved your case and this statement was wrong. And now what do you want us to do?" I said, "We will prepare the retraction and we want you to go on the air Monday night, at the same time as the preceding week, put the president of ABC on and announce that it was an incorrect statement." They did it entirely as we asked. They read our retraction. The whole matter disappeared. They said, "We've gone into it. We were wrong. We regret what Mr. Pearson said. We apologize to Senator Kennedy and we apologize to the Pulitzer Prize Committee." So the matter was cleared up.

Coming back on the trip, the Senator said, "I'll explain





Adlai Stevenson and Clark Clifford: "Dear Clark - Please loan me that wig! - Adlai"

to you why my father was so upset about it." He said, "We haven't told you before, but I'm going to run for President of the United States, and to have this hanging over us — the charge that I had offered this book to the American people and that I had been guilty of this kind of fraud and duplicity would be exceedingly damaging. That's why my father was so upset." "But," he said, "thank Heavens it's out of the way." And he said, "I hope that you might support my candidacy."

And I said, "I would like to support your candidacy but six months ago I made a commitment to Senator Symington who has been a friend of mine for twenty-five years." Senator Kennedy then, with his usual grace, said, "Well, of course I would expect you to be for Stu. If I had a friend of twenty-five years and he wouldn't support me, I wouldn't think he was much of a friend."

It went along that way until the Los Angeles Convention.

I'm taking this one illustration because I think it's the one political note I will sound. And President Kennedy called and said "Come over and see me". He had a private suite in Los Angeles. I went over there and he said, "I would like Senator Symington to throw his strength to me on the first ballot." He said, "We have analyzed all the votes. He cannot make it. And if he would throw his strength to me on the first ballot, I believe I could make it on the first ballot." I said, "I don't think he'll do that." He said, "Will you ask him?" I said, "Of course, I'll ask him. But he has always known that he wasn't going to make it

on the first ballot but he is a second choice selection among many of the candidates and among many supporters. And Symington thought he might very well be a compromise candidate." "Well," he said, "You ask him."

I asked him. Senator Symington said, "I've got a great many people supporting me. They've contributed to me. I'm going to go on that first ballot." Senator Kennedy said, "All right, I understand that."

The next day, he called and said, "Is he going to change his mind?" I said, "No, he will not change his mind." After Kennedy was nominated, the phone rang again and he said, "Come on over." Now, he said, "I'm speaking to you as Senator Symington's close friend." He said, "We have decided after looking at the whole field that we would like Senator Symington to be my running mate. He comes from the Middle West and has the right kind of strength. We think that we'll make a good combination. What do you think his attitude toward that would be?" I said, "I have no idea. It's never been discussed." He said, "Will you please find out from him if he will do that."

I went over and told Senator Symington. He said, "I want to get my family together." So he got his wife, two sons and daughters-in-law. Marny and I joined them for dinner. And the whole time was taken up discussing it. Some were for it and some were against it. At the end of the dinner, he said, "I've made my decision. I will accept." I went back to Senator Kennedy and I said, "Senator Symington accepts." We shake hands. I go back and congratulate Senator Symington and I said, "It is a fait





**Palm Beach, Fla. President-Elect Kennedy and Clark Clifford**

accompli."

That night, a group of prominent Democratic politicians met under the informal chairmanship of Sam Rayburn. Sam Rayburn, Russell Long, Dick Russell, Bob Kerr. Mostly Southerners and border state Democrats. And they very carefully canvassed the Electoral votes. They went through it meticulously and they decided that Senator Kennedy could not win unless he could carry Texas. And they felt he could carry Texas if he would take Lyndon Johnson as his running mate. Also that Kennedy might get some other Southern states if Senator Johnson was on the ticket. It's four o'clock in the morning. They go over to Senator Kennedy and they say, "This is the conclusion we have reached." And he said, "I can't do that. I can't take that." They said, "No, listen to us." Two hours later they had him persuaded that this had to be done. Six o'clock, my phone rings. "Can you come over to see me?" He's still up. He said, "I must do something that I've never done before in my political career. I must go back on a commitment. They have persuaded me that this is necessary but I don't want to see Senator Symington quite yet. If you will take him the word, though, I want him to hear it from me and not hear it or see it in the paper."

I go back. Senator Symington was really quite relaxed about it. I think he felt some sense of disappointment but he had never been overly enthusiastic about it anyway.

The election came on. Senator Kennedy won by a hair. It got down to how Illinois was going to go and there was some question about whether or not Mr. Nixon might file an election contest in Illinois and hold the decision up. It was found out on a careful analysis that this group of Southerners were absolutely right. Kennedy could not have won without carrying Texas, and Lyndon Johnson carried Texas for him.

An interesting political incident.

Not much of my experiences would be in the political field because I never have been nearly so interested in politics and I have been interested in government.

One more quick incident about President Kennedy. He came in in January 1961. In April 1961, they had had a very successful three months getting started. In April came the debacle of the Bay of Pigs.

My telephone rang and Mrs. Lincoln, his secretary, said he wanted to see me right away. I went at once to the Oval Office where I found him looking more dejected than I had ever seen him. And he said, "I do not believe I could survive another catastrophe like this. This has been an utter, awful tragedy." And he said, "I have thought of nothing else, and I have analyzed what happened to me." And he gave an analysis that was so accurate. It had a valuable lesson. It would mean a lot to all of us. Because it would apply in government, in business, in science. In any

human endeavor. He said, "Number One, I made the mistake I did because I was given the wrong advice. This advice was wrong because it was based upon incorrect facts. And the incorrect facts were the result of faulty intelligence." And he said, "In an effort to take every step at preventing this again, I am appointing a ten-man commission to conduct a full, exhaustive survey of our foreign intelligence operation." He says, "It has really failed me on this occasion."

He appointed a group of extraordinary men. One was Dr. Baker, head of research at Bell Telephone. Another was Edwin Land who was perfecting the Land camera and the most sophisticated cameras of that kind. Bob Murphy, one of our outstanding State Department ambassadors. General Jimmy Doolittle to represent the military. I was privileged to be one of those appointed.

We met at once and went to work and divided the world into different sections. Every man had a section of the world that was his responsibility. And we went to work on it and worked as assiduously as any group that I had ever seen. And our intelligence apparatus was in a state of serious disrepair. And from the time that the Committee was created until the end of President Kennedy's term, we submitted some 211 recommendations for changes, of which some 208 were accepted. And not only was it one of the most fascinating pursuits, but it gave one a feeling that here is an area that is enormously difficult for a democracy to conduct. But it has to be done. It's the meanest, deadliest activity that goes on in the world. And it goes on twenty-four hours a day. We could not exist without dependable

intelligence.

When those two British intelligence officers, you remember, many years ago defected and went back to the Soviet Union, some of our best men in different places of the world disappeared. We never heard another word about them. When you read in the paper some time about some individual being charged with being a spy — we never like to see the publicity on it, but if we don't conduct the best intelligence that we can then we cannot meet the challenge of the modern world.

A minute on Lyndon Johnson. A man of strange fascination. A man who so revelled in being President that one felt that from the age of three he probably wanted to be President of the United States. He loved it. He loved the feeling of power. In good times and bad, this was what he always wanted to do. And then finally he got it, and there were some parts of it that he did supremely well. His knowledge of the workings of the Congress was thoroughly credible and creditable. And that went very well. He could get his programs through. It could have been an effective, successful Presidency except for Vietnam.

I started supporting our policy in Vietnam. As time went on, the doubts accumulated in my mind. President Johnson sent General Maxwell Taylor and me to the Pacific and the Southeast Asia area in the summer of 1967 to see all of the countries there and bring him back an evaluation. I found that they did not view the war as we did and they were much closer to the threat of the war than we. And I came back deeply worried and concerned. But the President listened to me, put it in its proper place and said,



White House Rose Garden: Clark Clifford and President Kennedy 1962.



1964

"But we are prevailing and we are getting close to success." And it seemed that way to me too. Our military said we were getting close to success. President Johnson called in the group of Wise Men in the fall of '67. They heard a day-long briefing and they voted, I think unanimously, to carry on with the policy.

Then came Tet and all was reversed. It was at that time that he had sent me to the Pentagon. I spent that first month in constant conferences, day after day, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I couldn't get the answers that I wanted. "How long will we be in the war?" "We don't know." "Must we continue the bombing?" "Yes." "Is the enemy weakening?" "We think so." I couldn't find out what our plan was for victory in the war. All I was being offered was the fact that if we kept up the pressure, attrition would ultimately force the enemy to capitulate. I asked, "Is there any sign of that now?" "No."

After that exhausting month, I decided that we had a real loser on our hands and we were not going to prevail. The rest of the time was given to the effort to convince President Johnson that it was best that we get out. We could have been mired there for years and years and years to come.

The long relationship that President Johnson and I had had deteriorated very badly. My change in attitude made it very difficult for him. It is, however, greatly to his credit that he felt strongly otherwise but, after a long time, he finally decided to change. On the evening of March 31, 1968, he announced to the country that he was not going to send any more troops to Vietnam. They did not know it — the press didn't know it — but what he was saying was, "I

now no longer am going to seek victory in Vietnam. We're going to get it through negotiation."

What a privilege it has been for 41 years to be part of this. To know the country's leaders. To meet the world's leaders. And feel a part of it, even if just on the periphery. And occasionally somebody would ask, "Is there any one lesson do you think that you have learned from this unique experience?" And I would say, "Yes."

And I could talk at length about it. But let me synthesize it by one brief statement made by that outstanding editor in the 19th Century, Horace Greeley:

"Fame is a vapor. Popularity an accident. Riches take wings. Those who cheer today may curse tomorrow. Only one thing endures: Character."

Thank you very much.

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RAIFORD: We will start with the questions. Mr. Clifford. This is a two-part. And the first part is offering some advice to you. Please, please write the book. In the title of your speech, the "what if", what if Adlai Stevenson had become president?

CLIFFORD: I knew Governor Stevenson. He was a very able man. I didn't know him well enough to reach an independent conclusion about his abilities. President Truman had gotten to know him through the years quite well and he was concerned about what he thought was an inability on Governor Stevenson's part to make decisions. And the President knew from his own experience that that



is fatal in the Presidency. You can postpone a decision and pretty soon it's twice as bad. And then you postpone it again and it becomes impossible. And you must step up and meet the issues and that was why he searched for another candidate in 1952 other than Adlai Stevenson, mainly for that reason. He liked him and he admired him and he appreciated his liberal views. He felt that his indecisiveness would have been a serious drawback had he been elected President.

RAIFORD: Do you have any anecdotes on the transition between the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations?

CLIFFORD: Transitions in the past had been difficult and trying because usually it was the winning candidate having to ride up to the Capitol for the Inauguration with the losing candidate. And those were not very pleasant trips together. But this time it wasn't quite that way because it was not Truman running against Eisenhower. President Eisenhower rendered every support he could to the young man, President-Elect Kennedy, who was coming into office. And he arranged to get to know President Kennedy better. He didn't think much of him at first. I had the privilege of going with President-Elect Kennedy the day before he was inaugurated and we spent a morning with President Eisenhower going over all of the problems which President Eisenhower was leaving and which President-Elect Kennedy was assuming. And it was at that time that President Eisenhower told a story that he had told me one time after he had talked a good deal about Southeast Asia. He wanted to give President-Elect

Kennedy some concept of what it might be like to deal with the Soviets.

In the closing days of the Second World War, President Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces was moving from the west and General Zhukov, head of the Soviets, was moving from the east. They both were moving at about the same rate of speed. Each wanted to keep up with the other. General Eisenhower came to a point where, after crossing a slight range in the typography, he had to then go through a valley. The Germans had land-mined it with thousands of mines and General Eisenhower said it took him two and a half days to send the Engineers through there and get rid of all those mines. Then they could proceed.

And he said he was thinking of that at his luncheon with General Zhukov which they had together after Hitler and the Third Reich fell. He told that story to General Zhukov. And, as he did, he said he saw a thin cynical smile on Zhukov's face. And when he finished, Zhukov said, "General, we had the same problem as we came from the east. We were following the Germans closely and we were inflicting great damage, so we stayed on top of them." Then he said, "We came to the same point as you, with the land mines." He said, "I found a solution to it." And he said, "We met the same problem that took you two days." He said, "I met that problem and solved it in half an hour." And General Eisenhower said, "I can't believe it. What did you do?" And Zhukov said, "I sent a division through there." A combat division at that time of the Soviet Army was 12,000 men. And he sent a division



Washington D.C.: General Maxwell Taylor and Clark Clifford 1967





Washington D.C.: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Secretary-Designate Clark Clifford 1968

through the mine field and his army waited, and then when the mines were cleared the troops went on. I suppose he would justify it by saying that it was necessary to keep the pressure on.

President Eisenhower did everything he could to make the transition as easy as possible. I think it was the best one to date, because he permitted those persons who were named by Kennedy to go in at once before Kennedy took over, sit with his out-going counterpart and learn the ropes before he went in. I have the greatest respect for President Eisenhower.

RAIFORD: Will you please comment on Mr. Truman's thoughts and decision on approving the dropping of the atomic bomb?

CLIFFORD: Everything I know about that decision, I know from the President himself. Because the events leading up to it took place before my position at the White House was such that I would have been in on the meetings — which I was not. But he spoke many times about it afterwards because recurring criticism would come up. So I know exactly how he felt about it.

We had reached the point where we had concluded the war in Europe. We were now getting ready for the great offensive in the Pacific. The military had plans for a long time for the ultimate final amphibious assault upon the Japanese Islands. The Japanese had fought with incredible ferocity. The control that the Japanese military had on the minds and bodies of the Japanese people were such that we assumed, and I think properly so, that they would fight to the death. The Japanese had retained 2,000,000 of their picked troops to protect the motherland. Four

thousand of their planes — even though they had lost any number of planes in the military engagements in the Pacific. They had kept these in reserve because they knew there would be the ultimate confrontation of the Second World War. Our military leaders submitted a program and plan to President Truman. It told about just how the ultimate amphibious assault would be conducted. As you may know, that's the most difficult kind of military assault because of the vulnerability. You're reasonably safe until you begin to transfer your troops from the troopships into the LST landing craft. You're very vulnerable then. The vulnerable period exists while the landing craft are making their way from the ships to the shore and subject to plane attack and artillery attack. When the troops come ashore they have to wade in and are subject to machine-gun fire. We lost thousands of troops in those amphibious assaults. Here would be the pick of the Japanese troops, their best planes, their best artillery in that final defense of the homeland.

The military said we will experience 500,000 casualties. That we think is the minimum; 250,000 killed, 250,000 wounded. In addition to that, in preparation for the assault, we will conduct bombings on all the principal cities of Japan. Fire bombings in many of their cities. We would anticipate that those casualties could be in the neighborhood of 3,000,000. And the President said one time, "I felt that I held in the palm of my hand the lives of 250,000 fine American men." And he said, "I also thought of what those other boys go through when they come out of a conflict of that kind badly wounded. I thought of those people — civilians — that would die in Japan." And



**Oval Office: Secretary Clifford and President Johnson at Medal of Honor Ceremonies. 1968**

paramount importance to us from the standpoint of the safety of Europe after the Second World War.

Nicaragua I put in a different category. It's something we want to watch with care. I would refrain from seeking a military confrontation there. I don't think that that's likely to prove necessary. The people in Central America continue to look upon us with considerable suspicion — the great Yankee from the North. So I would proceed with considerable caution. Congress has decided to support the Contras. We will see ultimately what comes from it. I do not consider it in the same category of seriousness. The President at one time sent a message — Mr. Reagan did — to the Congress saying that our national security was involved in Nicaragua. I cannot agree with him on that. I think that, should any situation develop there — should a Russian base be set up there, we could wipe it out like that [snap]. With the forces we have, nothing could take place in Nicaragua that could threaten us for a moment. So I would regard them entirely differently.

**RAIFORD:** As your last question, will you please give us comments on the recent meeting in Reykjavik. [Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, October 1986]

**CLIFFORD:** Well, we will agree that this is a very current topic. One's attitude toward the meeting in Reykjavik would depend to a considerable extent upon his previous attitude towards the SDI or what we popularly call "Star Wars".

I have never agreed with President Reagan that the Star Wars plan can realistically or ultimately be carried out. I do not believe that scientifically you can put a great shield or umbrella over this enormous country and prevent the

entry of any nuclear missile. I do not believe that. I think I do not know a scientist today who is willing to accept that thesis. There are many within the Administration now who have backed away from that, because searching for that ultimate umbrella could involve hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars.

And then there is one fundamental defect, in my opinion, in the concept. After you have it and you have put anywhere, it's estimated, from a half a trillion to a trillion dollars into it, you're never able to test it. You can test stopping one missile. You can't ever test the system against 8,000 Soviet missiles coming over, which is what we would have to expect. Mixed with dummy warheads and then a whole flock of dummies — another two or three thousand dummies — and the system has to stop those too. And then another flock of true missiles being shot. So you never really know what you have.

It has been suggested by a number in the Administration that it has another use and that is, on a modified basis around our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, you might set up small safeguards. And there may be some merit to that. But if you stop to think about it, that's inconsistent with what Mr. Reagan said. Mr. Reagan said to the American people, "Which would you rather have? Would you rather have this shield that would protect us from the intrusion of any nuclear device or would you like to continue with our present plan which is called mutual assured destruction?"

We can destroy the Soviets and the Soviets can destroy us. Anybody in his right mind would say, "I take the first one. That's much nicer. I like that better." But my own



opinion is, it is unattainable. There is a modification of it though, as I say, to surround our ballistic missiles — intercontinental missiles — with these defensive contrivances that they are working on that might make us safer than we are. But that has not gotten away from mutual assured destruction. All we are doing then is saying, “If you attack us, what we are doing is protecting our ability to attack you.” So, to a certain extent we are back where we started.

Now I think that has some significance because during this last week at the negotiations in Reykjavik — it seems to me that when they reached the point that the Soviets were making a number of important concessions, the suggestion that medium-sized missiles be withdrawn from Europe — that is a wonderful forward step — even the suggestion that over the next five years we cut down the ballistic missiles that each side has by 50 per cent and then consider how to cut them down in the following five years — this is enormous progress. When that type of negotiation ran into the existence of our Star Wars plan, Mr. Reagan said in his remarks after the meeting was over, he said, “I said to them, ‘We will not today give up our Star Wars Plan, nor will we ever give it up.’”

I would have hoped that he might have said, “Well the suggestions that you are making about changes in ballistic power, are very interesting. Of course, the Star Wars plan is tied into it. As you know, I believe in it very deeply. But let us study now the suggestions that you have made. Let’s keep everything open. I suggest that all is open to further negotiation.” I would have preferred that to be the ending

of it instead of Secretary Shultz having to go public and saying this is a deeply disappointing experience for us because it has ended on a note of no agreement whatsoever.

There is another factor present. All of you will know from the press and media over these past years, one of the main reasons the President has said he wishes to continue the Star Wars plan is, he says the Soviets are working on a Star Wars plan. And therefore we must work on it.

If that is so, then it seems to me that that is a negotiable area. If we are working on it because they are working on it, then as we negotiate on these affairs, let’s also negotiate on that. Maybe they might stop working on it. Or we might stop working on it in consideration of the wonderful advances in cutting ballistic missiles. I have the feeling that ultimately we may begin to reach some kind of understanding. It is my hope that Mr. Reagan will begin to feel the possibility of the contribution that he can make in cutting missiles by working out a plan. The Soviets say, “You do not have to stop your Star Wars plan. Limit it to study and research within the laboratory.” Now maybe we can work out something in that regard.

What the Soviets are concerned about — and I might say I am concerned about — is taking the present contest of nuclear weapons that are ground-based and adding to that another confrontation in space. If we go that route, then the Soviets will go that route. We started with the atomic bomb. In a very short period of time, the Soviets had the atomic bomb. Next, we decided to go the route of the hydrogen bomb. Shortly thereafter they had the hydrogen bomb. We then decided to MIRV our missiles. You have



# The Orphan Finds A Home

By Robert A. Cutter

When Democratic Presidential candidate Alfred E. Smith visited Hartford, Connecticut in 1928, he began a chain of events that culminated 61 years later in the opening of a great political Americana repository.

In the Nutmeg State, Smith enthralled many people, including a rising young insurance executive named J. Doyle DeWitt. DeWitt was a War I Navy veteran — he had been part of the now largely forgotten “splinter fleet” of small, wooden-hulled craft that fought the new and frightening German submarine menace. Navy service had broadened DeWitt’s admittedly patrician views and made him (in modern parlance) socially conscious. In that light he readily took to Smith, his New York accent and brashness notwithstanding, because of the candidate’s concept of helping better people’s lives.

DeWitt was smitten not just with the candidate, but also with the whole campaign and with its many appurtenances — buttons, banners, cartoons, music, posters, everything — and with what they represented . . . the

American political process for change. So one thing DeWitt became was *not* just “a button collector”. Nor was he a one-candidate or one-campaign specialist (though he had his favorites, of course).

The 1928 frenzy — most certainly one of the dirtiest campaigns in history — not only sparked DeWitt’s interest, but shaped his collecting objective toward building a history of American political campaigning in general with an eye to causes and motivations, too.

He collected everything, though after awhile not personally. As he rose within The Travelers Insurance Companies (becoming its President in 1952, then Board Chairman in 1964), DeWitt got help in his collecting from others. Employees and agents across the country fed the boss’s hobby. At campaign time, he employed special agents (or, as DeWitt liked to call them, “pickers”) to garner materials at meetings, on the streets and at the conventions.

The DeWitt Collection (as it would eventually become



J. Doyle DeWitt (L) with Governors Theodore McKeldin (Maryland) and John Lodge (Connecticut) at display of the collection - 1956





The DeWitt Collection on display at Travelers Insurance Building - Mid 1950's

known), grew by leaps and bounds. In the 1950s and '60s, when it was publicly shown as "America Goes to the Polls" by Travelers, the collection had some 30,000 items. Perhaps 6,000 items at most were shown at any one time after that — "glamou" items like buttons, badges, banners and 3D items — but the truly exciting rare paper items, recordings, an in-depth medallion collection, hopeful and third-party material, etc., only the aficionado saw — if Doyle liked him.

DeWitt was a trustee of the University of Hartford, and had been one of the community involved in its founding in 1956. In 1959, he began donating parts of his collection to the University and continued doing so until his death in 1972, when everything remaining went to the University, but without any monetary funding.

When Expo '67 in Montreal, the 1976 Bicentennial in England, or the 1977 inaugural exhibition at the George Pompidou Center in Paris drew on the DeWitt Collection, again it was the more familiar pieces that were displayed. But back in Hartford, in a Prospect Avenue West End mansion owned by the University, closets, halls, whole rooms, and attic and basement storage spaces still were crammed with the amazing bulk of the DeWitt Collection.

Here, too, were DeWitt's custom-made wooden storage cases with sliding drawers filled with trays of treasures that few collectors had ever seen. Drawer after drawer of Washington and Lincoln items, for example, staggering not only in number, but in variety. Drawers of material from each succeeding convention of the major parties, along with third party and hopeful materials, too. In every nook and cranny were posters, banners, 3D items, and especially more esoteric paper — newspapers, booklets, fans, match covers, fliers, anything and everything.

Although most of this material was uncatalogued, DeWitt was meticulous with lapel pieces . . . in fact, much of his fame in the collecting community rested with a heavy, glossy-papered, privately printed catalogue, *A Century of Campaign Buttons, 1798-1889*, that he published in 1959 (which later was revised by Ed Sullivan, in 1981).

In truth, there were no "campaign buttons" in DeWitt's book and his actual *button* collection, though extensive, paled in comparison with his lapel pieces, as did his paper, china, glass, wood and textile holdings . . . many truly spectacular and in some cases irreplaceable pieces.



Parade Tableau - Upper Level



Sculptor William Klapp adjusting a parade figure



Curator Edmund B. Sullivan with Lincoln Bust and Torchlight



Center Gallery





Parade Tableau - Lower Level



Section of the History Wall



Even as DeWitt donated holdings to the University, he continued to add items. After 1968, when a 39-year-old education professor from Salem, Massachusetts, Edmund B. Sullivan joined UH and became unofficial curator of the University's DeWitt collection, more recent materials and occasional gap-fillers were added by his judicious trading and buying, as well as by gifts from other collectors.

Sullivan had a modest personal collection back then and a scholarly interest in political memorabilia, but over time, his interest and involvement with the DeWitt Collection brought him to the forefront of acknowledged experts in the hobby, though being curator was an unpaid position in addition to his education teaching duties for many years.

By 1976, the DeWitt Collection numbered 45,000 items and that concerned University President Archibald Woodruff. The collection took up space, ate up maintenance funds and heavy insurance fees, but was becoming better known as a resource, which attracted inquiries that added to an ever-mounting budget challenge.

Woodruff also realized that, although in safe storage, the DeWitt Collection could deteriorate without an active program of restoration and conservation, which also would be costly. He decided it might be prudent to sell off the Collection.

"From his perspective, it was a good decision," says Sullivan, "but I had a different perspective back then, of course." Sullivan resisted for a variety of reasons, including an appreciation of what selling off the holdings at one fell swoop, as Woodruff wanted to do, would do to the economic stability of a hobby that he had grown to love.

More importantly, Sullivan saw the sheer waste that breaking up this irreplaceable treasure represented when all that might be needed was to have it used properly to start bringing dividends, rather than deficits, to the University.

At that moment, Woodruff retired and a new, promotion-minded president, Steven Trachtenberg, arrived. He challenged Sullivan to prove that the DeWitt Collection could be made into an asset. The new museum validates Ed Sullivan's vision.

Not that it was easy. A small grant provided the means to fund preparation of the first professional pitches for Federal funding. Although the proposal was rejected by the agency to which it had been directed, Trachtenberg was convinced by its logic and began supporting the museum idea wholeheartedly. The University president had bought a concept, but he also might be said to have bought the man behind the idea, too.

Ed Sullivan has the collector's passion, to go along with the true expert's eye, the museum professional's approach and the academic's reasoned approach to history.

True to his upbringing, Sullivan is a Massachusetts liberal Democrat, who still appreciates a Calvin Coolidge or Ronald Reagan for the office they held, if not their brand of politics. Like DeWitt, Sullivan is not a button snob, but appreciates the big picture and all kinds of

material. He delights in a \$2 item as much as a \$200 one, or one for \$2,000, for that matter.

Sullivan was the perfect choice to continue building the collection along DeWitt's own big-picture or multifaceted lines, and it was Trachtenberg who finally made Sullivan the collection's official curator in 1978, a recognition probably long overdue.

"It was the right person, in the right spot, at the right time," Sullivan says.

And it was Trachtenberg, a "power-broker" variety of educator, who took the Sullivan grant proposal and pressed the proposal before then Senior United States Senator from Connecticut, Lowell P. Weicker.

Voters turned out Weicker in the 1988 election, but whatever his faults or successes, collectors of political Americana have to be thankful to Senator Weicker for his actions in 1984.

Weicker offered an amendment to a National Library Expansion Act funding bill that gave the University of Hartford \$6.5 million to build a suitable home for the enlarged DeWitt Collection (which, by then, numbered about 60,000 items).

In the budget crunch of 1985, the projected appropriation made President Reagan's elimination list, but again Weicker — as committee chairman — came through, disregarding the recommendation and pushing the museum's funding through.

Trachtenberg added the \$6.5 million to funds already collected from several sources, including Harry Gray, United Technologies and others, to design and construct a long-needed University Center. The political museum became part of a resplendent \$20.8 million capital construction project with other facilities that complement the museum and enhance its potential use. Another grant of \$300,000, from the National Endowment for the Humanities provided conservation, improved storage and display mounting funds that were needed to ready the collection for its move to a permanent home.

Three men, then, assisted by many others along the way, can be said to be responsible for the creation and housing of what some had come to regard as "an orphan collection":

- Doyle DeWitt, a charter member of APIC in 1945, and an APIC director from 1960 until his death, started the collection and provided the foundation.
- Ed Sullivan gave it professionalism and focus, and helped it grow into a national treasure, and
- Lowell Weicker provided creative funding assistance at a critical time.

A father and two godfathers, as it were, who gave the "orphan" a rather resplendent home, called the Museum of American Political Life at the University of Hartford. ★

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## MOVING?

Be sure to notify APIC

P.O. Box 340339, San Antonio, TX 78234

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# INSIDE THE MUSEUM OF AMERICAN POLITICAL LIFE

By Robert A. Cutter

Uncontrolled light — particularly sunlight — is an enemy of rare and fragile memorabilia made of celluloid, textiles or paper.

Hence, the first thing that will strike you about the new Museum of American Political Life (MAPLe) is that it largely is underground and out of ultraviolet light's way. Quickly you will see also that this is not just a button collection — the misconception of too many collectors when they heard the words "DeWitt Collection." But that collection really is no more.

Even the original 30,000 items or so that were Doyle DeWitt's famed collection included a limited number of campaign buttons. Predominating were metallic, paper, ceramic and textile items. And the over 30,000 items that have been added through the years since 1972 have maintained that ratio. When a Duluth college professor donated 1,800 cause items, or George Wallace and his supporters contributed important holdings from his 1968 Independent Party run and subsequent Democrat cam-

paigns, or the two major parties contributed materials, these often were non-button items. Since 1968, as curator Ed Sullivan filled in gaps or added new campaigns, buttons were included, but other items predominated.

MAPLe, after all, is not, strictly speaking, a collector's museum, but has a far wider range of roles. It will attract campaign button collectors, but also scholars and the general public as well.

"Political Americana should be seen as an exciting resource for educating the public," says Sullivan. "So we plan outreach programs for schools and other public groups, teaching materials, seminars, and workshops, to name a few general public activities.

"Our collection ranges from the historically important to the most bizarre, tacky junk you'd ever want to see, exactly like the Smithsonian's collection. How do we differ? Well, their collection is preeminent in Presidential association items — personal Presidential items, First Lady inaugural gowns, that sort of thing. Ours, I think, is



Lincoln Artifacts in the Folk Art Exhibit





different in the range and quality of our items and their potential uses."

Sullivan is uncomfortable making further comparisons between the two collections, believing each supplements the other, not competes, but he is filled with pride about the new MAPLe complex.

"I believe we have support facilities as good as any political museum or library in the country. We have learned from those who have gone before us. With more money, we could have done things in a grander way, but with what we had, I believe we have gotten the biggest possible bang for the buck, as it were.

"Sure, I'd like to show everything as a collector, but as a more practical educational professional, I know that we have to recognize there CAN be too much of a good thing. Our entire collection could overwhelm most people.

"You could lose sight of the true value of this collection if everything sat out there in front of you. The Smithsonian found that out long ago," says Sullivan. "The Smithsonian still is the Nation's Attic, with a place for everything, but now it exhibits and interprets materials in the best possible educational way, and that's what we're trying to do, too."

But the average collector won't be disappointed in MAPLe. Located on the Bloomfield Avenue campus of the

University of Hartford, the museum is one small part of a \$20.8 million red-brick 145,000-square-foot building, around its own quadrangle, that took 2½ years (September, 1986, to April, 1989) to build. The modern design, using traditional materials that meld in with the existing William H. Mortensen Library to which it technically is an addition, was designed by Hartford-based Korean architect Tai Soo Kim, who specializes in public buildings.

As you enter through the ground-level doors, you are met by displays of campaign banners and flags on the one side and political folk art on the other. But the high-ceilinged chamber is dominated by an open, 40' x 40' square protected by a chrome-and-glass-trimmed railing, broken only by twin spiral stairways that lead to the main, lower-level gallery.

The public uses one stairway. On the other life-size figures parade, carrying campaign banners and torchlights reminiscent of the 1860 Hartford "Wide Awake Club" that marched for Abraham Lincoln. There is stirring campaign music, of course, and at the bottom, a "candidate" who looks somewhat like William Jennings Bryan is speaking to a group of onlookers.

There are 17 of these lifesize mannequins, made of 5/8" thick gypsum cement and perlite, sculpted over steel



General Washington Fabric - CA. 1785



Campaign Ratchets - 1892



Ivory Miniature - George Washington  
Parke-Curtis - CA. 1807



Washington Inaugural  
Commemorative Tankard - 1789



Rose Leaf Jar Bearing Portraits of  
John Adams and James Madison



French Silk Scarf - CA. 1816

frames, and averaging 250 pounds each. They were created by William Klapp of White Hall, Maryland, who (like Norman Rockwell and his *Saturday Evening Post* covers) used many living models as inspirations, including his son and Ed Sullivan among others.

Many permanent and changing exhibits await your pleasure on the spacious, but comfortably filled exhibition floor of 8,600 square feet (with 6,400 square feet of support space, i.e. storage, work, conservation and visiting scholar facilities).

Permanent exhibits include:

- *The Right to Vote*, with emphasis on the 14th and 15th Amendments, Women's Suffrage, and Ethnic Campaigning.
- *Log Cabin to White House*, a presentation of biographical campaign artifacts, including depictions of Presidential candidates as Military Hero, Family Man and Mr. Clean; and a visitor-activated video display featuring commercials from 1952 to 1988.
- *Peace, Prosperity & Progress*, featured as premier campaign issues.
- *The Presidency & the Press*, documenting not just print from the early 19th Century to today, but also showing a film that describes the impact of television on White House campaigning.

Other permanent exhibits will follow, including one that will create a typical oldtime campaign headquarters and another on casting the ballot, which will include early and current voting machines.

Temporary exhibits will draw upon the other 97% of MAPLe holdings that are in storage at any given time (1,500 items, or 3% of the MAPLe collection, is on permanent exhibition, which will allow the museum to mount touring shows or loan materials to other exhibits without detracting from its own exhibition).

Also on exhibit will be materials loaned from outside the museum. The opening show, for example, included a Presidential painting exhibition on loan from Rex Stark.

But there is one remaining permanent exhibit area that probably will set the typical collector's heart racing.

This is the "History Wall" or timeline — a 70-foot presentation depicting Presidents, parties, economic conditions, cultural icons (including films, paintings and news/TV images that anchor one's thoughts to a particular era) and issues from Washington and 1789 to George Bush and 1989.

Beneath the wall itself is a continuous 70-foot display case with nearly a thousand medals, buttons, 3D items, and small paper, glass and textile pieces that make up most collector's dreams.

But this mouth-watering display is representative, not overwhelming. It supports the educational wall and, in turn, is better interpreted by that display.


As already mentioned, Doyle DeWitt "specialized", for example, in Washington and Lincoln. His collection as it arrived at the University had 300 items about the first President and 2,000 about the 16th. In the initial MAPLe display, perhaps 10 Washington and 30 or so Lincoln pieces actually are on display.

In years to come, other pieces will get their turns for visitors to see. But, eventually, for the truly involved, for the researcher, scholar and serious collector, those with a legitimate "need to see," all the riches of MAPLe will be accessible for viewing by special arrangement.

A series of tough choices had to be made as to what would form the permanent exhibition. "When I say 'tough', I really mean TOUGH," says Sullivan. "We argued and argued with the design consultants, which was good. It made me face up to justifying the integrated value of each piece that eventually made it out into the galleries."



Cotton Banner - 1856




Salesman's Card - 1896





Torchlight Parade Display



Large Wall Banner showing northern Democrats (Buchanan and Breckinridge) in alliance with slave-holding southern Democrats. Reverse reads: "John C. Fremont will never go up Salt River."

MAPLe's interior design consultants were Staples & Charles of Washington, DC (Robert Staples and Barbara Fahs Charles, both of whom worked on the project), nationally renowned for their expertise in designing museums. But again, the final decisions rested with Ed Sullivan, with input from many others with whom he consulted.

As one example, the Cause exhibit is built around 15 notable American leaders in protest, propaganda and cause movements from the birth of the Republic to the present.

Sullivan started with better than 90 possible candidates for inclusion. Cutting that list to 15 was a formidable task. Not only did the cause have to have staying power, but so did the individual who best personalized that cause.

"Using that criterion, Jane Fonda went away fast — what is she into now, aerobics?" asks Sullivan. "Ralph Nader lasted a bit longer, but he went away, too.

"Some like Eugene Debs or Martin Luther King were obvious. Others, like Eleanor Roosevelt, seem less so until you think about it. Caesar Chavez made it, Abbe Hoffman didn't. Norman Thomas didn't because he was Debs's pupil and stood for many of the same ideas. I'm sure the choices will cause continuing controversy, but that's good. Getting people thinking about what they are seeing is a main purpose of the museum. One of our visitors recently described us as 'the thinking person's museum' — that pleased me immensely." Once the key leaders of causes through American history had been chosen, next came finding and obtaining photographs and preparing artifacts that best illustrated why that cause/subject was selected. Last was the need to create an attractive and

understandable explanation integrated with the other 14.

Like MAPLe's complete collection, the big picture was always in mind, not just single, charismatic individual or "blockbuster" items that influence so many collectors.

Something else that will strike you about the permanent exhibit is its humor and range.

Thus, an Alfred E. Neumann for President poster gets equal billing with a McKinley one. Psychedelic Bobby Kennedy and Nelson Rockefeller hopeful posters from 1968 share space with nearby Goldwater and Carter 3D "posters" few collectors have ever seen, nor will likely possess.



Campaign Button - 1908

From this angle, button shows Democratic Donkey listening to Bryan in phonograph horn. Turned 1/4 to the right, a Republican Elephant listens to Taft in the horn.



Lapel Novelty Pins on Original Cards - 1904

A copy of *The Wizard of Oz* illustrates political satire. A copy of Hearst's *New York American* with a 2" headline screaming "WAR TODAY" sits with a caricature of Hearst as "The Yellow Kid". A Ron Reagan cloth doll, one side pro-Ron, the other anti, gets equal treatment with a fragile Blaine campaign lantern. Such is the comprehensiveness of MAPLe, and one of its great strengths.

Sullivan is not overly pessimistic about the fate of campaign materials in our high-tech election age, but he is not overly optimistic either. "People used to wear their politics on their sleeves. Politics was a public event, a participatory event, hence all the wonderful things we collectors love so much," says Sullivan. "Today, in our high-tech age, with television, politics has become depersonalized as far as personal political participation is concerned. We see more of the candidates (though not in person), but feel sure our vote is worth anything.

"Where once public political involvement was the American thing to do, it's rude to ask someone's politics now and we watch privately and write a check, if that, and may go out to vote or may not. The 20th Century is a far

cry from the 19th, that's for sure."

Sullivan says MAPLe will continue to add materials whenever possible. "Money always will be a problem as far as accessions go," he says. "Fortunately, there are many generous people out there, and we hope there will continue to be."

MAPLe particularly needs to increase its holdings in certain key areas, he believes, including third-party materials, the IWW (Wobblies), women's rights movements, political documentation (i.e., printed materials, unusual posters, 3D items, etc.) of the 1980s, and lots more.


About the museum itself, Ed Sullivan is, to put it mildly, estatic. "There have been very few people in the museum business who have had the chance to build from scratch. It's been an exciting process for me.

"I have a profound sense of personal satisfaction, something that I want to share with collectors everywhere. I think I'm one of the luckiest persons who ever lived."

And we're all lucky that the Museum of American Political Life is now a reality. ★



Metal Parade Helmet - 1884



Linen Campaign Banner - 1896





# NEWS

## AMERICAN POLITICAL ITEMS COLLECTORS 1988 Financial Report

### January 1, 1988 Balances:

Checking Account	\$ 3,129.77
Money Market Account	1,810.17
Mark Jacobs Intern Fund	<u>14,263.98</u>

### INCOME

1988 Regular Dues	\$42,656.00
1988 Family Dues	280.00
1988 Youth Dues	368.00
Dividends	362.91
Donations	900.70
Interest	1,144.66
Mailing Labels	1,005.79
Mailing Supply Service	1,948.03
Miscellaneous	140.00
Prepaid Dues	<u>3,144.00</u>
	\$51,950.09
	<u><u>\$71,154.01</u></u>

### EXPENDITURES

APIC Handbook Binders	\$ 1,687.50
Return of Big Apple Chapter Funds	500.00
Computer Expenses	3,194.80
Mailing Expenses	1,913.50
Mailing Supply Service	688.81
Miscellaneous Expenses	811.53
Newsletter Editor's Expenses	455.51
Newsletter Expense (Pol. Bandwagon)	5,107.25
Office Expenses	861.50
Postage Expenses	5,519.44
Photography Expenses	790.15
Printing Expenses	27,071.79
Republican Nat'l Conv. Booth	220.37
Roster & Update Expenses	300.00
Secretary's Compensation	4,552.00
Secretary's Expenses	636.96
Storage Expense	375.00
Telephone Expense	<u>470.00</u>
	\$55,156.11

### December 31, 1988 Balances:

Checking Account	452.92
Money Market Account	153.27
Mark Jacobs Intern Fund	<u>15,391.71</u>
Total	<u><u>\$15,997.90</u></u>
	<u><u>\$71,154.01</u></u>

Respectfully Submitted,

*Joseph D. Hayes*  
Joseph D. Hayes  
Secretary/Treasurer

## 1989-1991 APIC OFFICERS As Elected July 29, 1989

### PRESIDENT

Geary Vlk

### SECRETARY-TREASURER

Joseph D. Hayes

### VICE PRESIDENTS

Region #1 - Dr. Edmund Sullivan

Region #2 - Christopher B. Hearn

Region #3 - John R. Henigan

Region #4 - Roger A. Fischer

Region #5 - Neal Machander

Region #6 - Peggy Dillard

### BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Larry Brokofsky

Joseph G. Brown

Kenneth Florey

Robert Fratkin

David Frent

John Gearhart

Fred Jorgensen

Robert Levine

John Pendergrass

Julie Powell

Marc Sigoloff

Ellen Siles

Ed Stahl

Rex Stark

Fred Strickland

# APIC BY-LAWS REVISIONS

## As Approved July 29, 1989

### ARTICLE 4 - MEMBERSHIP-SECTION B

**HONORARY**-Honorary membership may be extended by a two-thirds vote of the Executive Board. Honorary members may not hold office, do not pay dues, and are not entitled to vote in APIC elections.

### ARTICLE 4 - MEMBERSHIP-SECTION C

Applicants for active membership shall apply on the form provided by the Secretary-Treasurer. The applicant must complete and sign the form and return to the Secretary-Treasurer, with dues and fees as established by the Executive Board. Membership categories are: individual, family and youth.

### ARTICLE 4 - MEMBERSHIP-SECTION D

Any member may be removed from membership, for good reason, as determined by a two-thirds vote of the APIC Executive Board. Any member removed from membership may be readmitted, after reapplying, by a two-thirds vote of the APIC Executive Board.

### ARTICLE 5 - DUES-SECTION B

Membership dues and fees for each membership category shall be established by the Executive Board. Membership categories are: individual, family and youth. Educational and museum memberships shall be at the same rate as youth memberships.

### ARTICLE 6 - OFFICERS-SECTION B

**OFFICERS**-The officers are President, six Vice-Presidents (each representing a different geographical region of the country), Secretary-Treasurer, and 15 directors (with at least one representing each region). These officers plus all living past Presidents, the chairman of the Ethics Committee, the chairman of the APIC Legal Advisory Committee, the editor of the Keynoter and the editor of the APIC Newsletter shall comprise the Executive Board.

### ARTICLE 6 - OFFICERS-SECTION C-9

In the event the APIC President is unable to fulfill his duties, a President will be elected to complete the term of office by a vote of the Secretary-Treasurer and the six regional Vice-Presidents. The election shall be held within 30 days, the Secretary-Treasurer is to preside. Announcement to the membership shall be made within 30 days of the election.

### ARTICLE 6 - OFFICERS-SECTION F

**BOARD OF DIRECTORS**-Fifteen directors (with at least one representing each region) are to be elected by the membership and assigned duties as determined by the President with the consent of the Executive Board.

### ARTICLE 7 - EXECUTIVE BOARD-SECTION A

**COMPOSITION**-The Executive Board shall be composed of the President, the six Vice-Presidents, Secretary-Treasurer, the fifteen directors, all living past Presidents, the chairman of the Ethics Committee, the chairman of the Legal Advisory Committee, the Keynoter editor and the editor of the APIC Newsletter.

### ARTICLE 8 - NOMINATIONS, ETC.-SECTION B

A nominating committee composed of seven members shall be selected by the President with consent of the Executive Board at least six months prior to the election. One member shall be selected from the Executive Board and six from the active membership with one member representing each region; one shall be named chairman. With the exception of the Executive Board member, the members of the committee may not place into nomination any of their own membership. To the best of its ability this committee will seek the widest and most equitable distribution of officers, both between regions and within regions.

### ARTICLE 8 - NOMINATIONS, ETC.-SECTION C

All voting for office shall be on the official ballot, with the candidates listed as follows: President, Vice-President, Secretary-Treasurer and the Board of Directors. Each regional Vice-President shall be elected solely by the votes of the members in that region.

### ARTICLE 9 - MEETINGS-SECTION D

2. Guests who are invited by active members (with the exception of expelled members, members who have submitted a letter of resignation, and collectors who have been refused membership in the APIC) may attend all functions, except the business meetings, which are limited to active members in good standing.

4. The APIC Executive Board agrees as follows: That only active members are entitled to display items at a bourse at any APIC function, and, that meeting officials, with the concurrence of the senior APIC officers in attendance, may request removal of any item deemed to be in violation of the APIC Code of Ethics. The dealer selling these items will either remove the items from sale or accept a table refund and leave the bourse.

5. All exhibitors at APIC-sponsored shows must sign a table rental agreement, agreeing to abide by the By-Laws and Code of Ethics of the APIC, or they will be refused table space.

### NEW-ARTICLE 13 - APIC/MARK JACOBS SMITHSONIAN INTERNSHIP PROGRAM-SECTION A

The President with consent of the Executive Board shall appoint a committee to oversee the funding and selection of an intern to serve during the summer months at the Smithsonian Institution. Members of the committee will be the APIC President, Secretary-Treasurer and five active members of the organization.

### NEW-ARTICLE 14 - APIC CODE OF ETHICS

The APIC-CODE OF ETHICS, as approved by the officers and members of the APIC Executive Board, is hereby included in the APIC BY-LAWS.

The APIC Code of Ethics shall be amended or revised at the discretion of the APIC Executive Board. The APIC Code of Ethics is exempt from the normal procedures for amending other sections of the By-Laws.



The President and Mr. Clifford after three  
weeks at Key West

Clark this was a happy occasion. Hope it  
won't be the last time. Hauptmann